ARAB-ISRAELI AIR WARS 1947-82 PDF
Arab-Israeli Air Wars by Shlomo Aloni, , available at Book Depository with free delivery worldwide. About Arab-Israeli Air Wars – When the UN called for the end of the British mandate and the partition of Palestine into two independent states, the RAF. Israel’s War of Independence against its Arab neighbours, the inevitable ’round two’, the Suez Crisis of , the Six Day War of , the Yom Kippur wars of.
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After 26 May The Arab—Israeli Waror the Israeli War of Independencewas fought between the newly declared State of Israel and a military coalition of Arab states over the control of former British Palestineforming the second and final stage of the —49 Palestine war. There had been tension and conflict between the Arabs and the Jewsand between each of them and the British forces, ever since the Balfour Declaration and the creation of the British Mandate of Palestine.
British policies dissatisfied both Arabs and Arab-isrraeli.
Arab-Israeli Air Wars 1947-82
The Arabs’ opposition developed into the — Arab revolt in Palestinewhile the Jewish resistance developed into the Jewish insurgency in Palestine — In these ongoing tensions erupted into civil warfollowing the 29 November adoption of the United Nations Partition Plan for Palestinewhich planned to divide Palestine into three areas: On 15 Maythe ongoing civil war transformed into an inter-state conflict between Israel and the Arab states, following the Israeli Declaration of Independence the previous day.
A combined invasion by EgyptJordan and Syriatogether with expeditionary forces from Iraqentered Palestine — Jordan having declared privately to Yishuv emissaries on 2 May that it would abide by a decision not to attack the Jewish state. Transjordan took control of the remainder of the former British mandate, which it annexedand the Egyptian military took control of the Gaza Strip. At the Jericho Conference on 1 December2, Palestinian delegates called for unification of Palestine and Transjordan as a step toward full Arab unity.
The conflict triggered significant demographic change throughout the Middle East. AroundPalestinian Arabs fled or were expelled from their homes in the area that became Israel, and they became Palestinian refugees  in what they refer to as Al-Nakba “the catastrophe”. In the three years following the war, aboutJews immigrated to Israel, with many of them having been expelled from their previous countries of residence in the Middle East.
Transjordanunder the Hashemite ruler Abdullah Igained independence from Britain in and was called Jordan inbut it remained under heavy British influence. Egypt gained nominal independence inbut Britain continued to exert a strong influence on the country until the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of which limited Britain’s presence to a garrison of troops on the Suez Canal until Lebanon became an independent state inbut French troops would not withdraw untilthe same year that Syria won its independence from France.
Iraq and Transjordan coordinated policies closely, signing a mutual defence treaty, while Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia feared that Transjordan would annex part or all of Palestine, and use it as a steppingstone to attack or undermine Syria, Lebanon, and the Hijaz.
On 29 Novemberthe United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution recommending the adoption and implementation of a plan to partition the British Mandate of Palestine into two states, one Arab and one Jewish, and the City of Jerusalem. The General Assembly resolution on Partition was greeted with overwhelming joy in Jewish communities and widespread outrage in the Arab world. In Palestine, violence erupted almost immediately, feeding into a spiral of reprisals and counter-reprisals.
The British refrained from intervening as tensions boiled over into a low-level conflict that quickly escalated into a full-scale civil war. From January onwards, operations became increasingly militarized, with the intervention of a number of Arab Liberation Army regiments inside Palestine, each active in a variety of distinct sectors around the different coastal towns.
They consolidated their presence in Galilee and Samaria. Having recruited a few thousand volunteers, al-Husayni organized the blockade of theJewish residents of Jerusalem. By March, Al-Hussayni’s tactic had paid off. Almost all of Haganah ‘s armoured vehicles had been destroyed, the blockade was in full operation, and hundreds of Haganah members who had tried to bring supplies into the city were killed.
While the Jewish population had received strict orders requiring them to hold their ground everywhere at all costs,  the Arab population was more affected by the general conditions of insecurity to which the country was exposed. Up toArabs, from the urban upper and middle classes in Haifa, Jaffa and Jerusalem, or Jewish-dominated areas, evacuated abroad or to Arab centres eastwards.
This situation caused the United States to withdraw its support for the Partition plan, thus encouraging the Arab League to believe that the Palestinian Arabs, reinforced by the Arab Liberation Army, could put an end to the plan for partition. The British, on the other hand, decided on 7 Februaryto support the annexation of the Arab part of Palestine by Transjordan.
Although a certain level of doubt took hold among Yishuv supporters, their apparent defeats were due more to their wait-and-see policy than to weakness.
David Ben-Gurion reorganized Haganah and made conscription obligatory. Every Jewish man and woman in the country had to receive military training.
Thanks to funds raised by Golda Meir from sympathisers in the United States, and Stalin’s decision to support the Zionist cause, the Jewish representatives of Palestine were able to sign very important armament contracts in the East. Other Haganah agents recuperated stockpiles from the Second World War, which helped improve the army’s equipment and logistics. Operation Balak allowed arms and other equipment to be transported for the first time by the end of March. Ben-Gurion invested Yigael Yadin with the responsibility to come up with a plan of offense whose timing was related to the foreseeable evacuation of British forces.
Arab Israeli Air Wars 1947–82
This strategy, called Plan Dalet, was readied by March and implemented towards the end of April. Both sides acted offensively in defiance of the Partition Plan, which foresaw Jerusalem as a corpus separatumunder neither Jewish nor Arab jurisdiction. The Arabs did not accept the Plan, while the Jews were determined to oppose the internationalization of the city, and secure it as part of the Jewish state.
During this time, and independently of Haganah or the framework of Plan Dalet, irregular fighters from Irgun and Lehi formations massacred a substantial number of Arabs at Deir Yassinan event that, though publicly deplored and criticized by the principal Jewish authorities, had a deep impact on the morale of the Arab population and contributed to generate the exodus of the Arab population.
At the same time, the first large-scale operation of the Arab Liberation Army ended in a debacle, having been roundly defeated at Mishmar HaEmek coinciding with the loss of their Druze allies through defection.
Within the framework of the establishment of Jewish territorial continuity foreseen by Plan Dalet, the forces of Haganah, Palmach and Irgun intended to conquer mixed zones. The Palestinian Arab society was shaken. The British had, at that time, essentially withdrawn their troops.
The situation pushed the leaders of the neighbouring Arab states to intervene, but their preparation was not finalized, and they could not assemble sufficient forces to turn the tide of the war. The majority of Palestinian Arab hopes lay with the Arab Legion of Transjordan’s monarch, King Abdullah I, but he had no intention of creating a Palestinian Arab-run state, since he hoped to annex as much of the territory of the British Mandate for Palestine as he could.
He was playing a double-game, being just as much in contact with the Jewish authorities as with the Arab League. In preparation for the offensive, Haganah successfully launched Operations Yiftah  and Ben-‘Ami  to secure the Jewish settlements of Galileeand Operation Kilshonwhich created a united front around Jerusalem. The inconclusive meeting between Golda Meir and Abdullah I, followed by the Kfar Etzion massacre on 13 May by the Arab Legion led to predictions that the battle for Jerusalem would be merciless.
On 14 MayDavid Ben-Gurion declared the establishment of the State of Israel and the Palestine war entered its second phase with the intervention of the Arab state armies and the beginning of the Arab—Israeli War.
InBen-Gurion decided that the Yishuv would probably have to defend itself against both the Palestinian Arabs and neighbouring Arab states and accordingly began a “massive, covert arms acquisition campaign in the West”, and acquired many more during the first few months of hostilities.
The Yishuv managed to clandestinely amass arms and military equipment abroad for transfer wir Palestine once the British blockade was lifted.
In the United StatesYishuv agents purchased three Boeing B Flying Fortress bombers, one of which bombed Cairo in Julysome Curtiss C Commando transport planes, and dozens of half-tracks, which were repainted and defined as war equipment”. In Western Europe, Haganah agents amassed fifty 65mm French mountain guns, twelve mm mortars, ten H light tanks, and a large number of half-tracks. By mid-May or thereabouts the Yishuv had purchased from Czechoslovakia 25 Avia S fighters an inferior version of the Messerschmitt Arab-israaeliheavy machine guns, 5, light machine guns, 24, rifles, and 52 million rounds of ammunition, enough to equip all units, but short of heavy arms.
The airborne smuggling missions were carried out by mostly American aviators — Jews and non-Jews — led by ex-U. Air Transport Command flight engineer Al Schwimmer. Schwimmer’s operation also included recruiting and training fighter pilots such as Lou Lenartcommander of the first Israeli air assault against the Arabs.
They were inaccurate but had a spectacularly loud explosion that demoralized the enemy. A large amount of the munitions used by the Israelis arab-izraeli from the Ayalon Institutea clandestine bullet factory underneath kibbutz Ayalonwhich produced about 2. The munitions produced by the Ayalon Institute were said to have been the only supply that was not in shortage during the war.
Locally produced explosives were also plentiful. After Israel’s independence, these clandestine arms manufacturing wara no longer had to be concealed, and were moved above ground. All of the Haganah’s weapons-manufacturing was centralized and later became Israel Military Wats.
In Novemberthe Haganah was an underground paramilitary force arab-ixraeli had existed as a highly organized, national force, since the Arab riots of — 21and throughout the riots ofGreat Uprising of —39 and World War 2. It had a mobile force, the HISHwhich had 2, full-time fighters men and women and 10, reservists all aged between 18 and 25 and an elite unit, the Palmach composed of 2, fighters and arab-sraeli, reservists.
The reservists trained three or four days a month [ citation needed ] and went back to civilian life the rest of the time. Guard Corpscomposed of people aged over The Yishuv’s total strength was around 35, with 15, to 18, fighters and a garrison force of roughly 20, There were also wsrs thousand men and women who had served in the British Army in World War II who did not serve in any of the underground militias but would provide valuable military experience during the war.
Five days later, a General Mobilization order was issued for all men under The Irgun, whose activities were considered by MI5 to be terrorism, was monitored by the British. By Marchthe Yishuv had a numerical superiority, with 35, mobilised and deployed fighters for the Haganah  3, of Stern and Irgunand a few thousand armed settlers.
The effective number of Arab combatants is listed at 12, by some historians  while others calculate a total Arab strength of approximately 23, troops, and with this being more of less or roughly equal to that of the Yishuv.
However, as Israel mobilized most of its most able wras during the war while the Arab troops were only a small percentage of its far greater population, the strength of the Yishuv grew steadily and dramatically during the war.
According to Benny Morris, by the end ofthe Palestinians “had a healthy and airr respect for the Yishuv’s military power” and if it came to battle the Palestinians expected to lose. Yishuv ‘s aims evolved during the war. As the war progressed, the aim of expanding the Jewish state beyond the UN partition borders appeared: A third and further aim that emerged among the political and military leaders after four or five months was to “reduce the size of Israel’s prospective large and hostile Arab minority, seen as a potential powerful fifth columnby belligerency and expulsion”.
Plan Daletor Plan D, Hebrew: If no resistance was met, the residents could stay put, under military rule. N sponsored Jewish state, several concentrations of Jewish population outside those areas West Jerusalem and Western Galileeand areas along the roads where the invading Arab armies were expected to attack.
The intent of Plan Dalet is subject to much controversy, with historians on the one extreme asserting that it was entirely defensive, and historians on the other extreme asserting that the plan aimed at maximum conquest and expulsion of the Palestinians.
Arab-Israeli Air Wars –82 – Shlomo Aloni – Google Books
The Yishuv perceived the peril of an Arab invasion as threatening its very existence. Having no real knowledge of the Arabs’ true military capabilities, the Jews took Arab propaganda literally, preparing for the worst and reacting accordingly.
The Arab League had unanimously rejected the UN partition plan and were bitterly opposed to the establishment of a Jewish state. The Arab League before partition affirmed the right to the independence of Palestine, while blocking the creation of a Palestinian government.
In April with the Palestinian defeat, the refugees coming from Palestine and the pressure of their public opinion, the Arab leaders decided to invade Palestine. The Arab League gave reasons for its invasion in Palestine in the cablegram: British diplomat Alec Kirkbride wrote in his memoirs about a conversation with the Arab League’s Secretary-General Azzam Pasha a week before the armies marched: We will sweep them into the sea.
According to Yoav Gelberthe Arab countries were “drawn into the war by the collapse of the Palestinian Arabs and the Arab Liberation Army [and] the Arab governments’ primary goal was preventing the Palestinian Arabs’ total ruin and the flooding of their own countries by more refugees. According to their own perception, had the invasion not taken place, there was no Arab force in Palestine capable of checking the Haganah’s offensive”. King Abdullah was the commander of the Arab Legionthe strongest Arab army involved in the war according to Rogan and Shlaim in In —47, Abdullah said that he had no intention to “resist or impede the partition of Palestine and creation of a Jewish state.
In order to keep their support to his plan of annexation of the Arab State, Abdullah promised to the British he would not attack the Jewish State. The neighbouring Arab states pressured Abdullah into joining them in an “all-Arab military invasion” against the newly created State of Israel, that he used to restore his prestige in the Arab world, which had grown suspicious of his relatively good relationship with Western and Jewish leaders.
While repeating assurances that Jordan would only take areas allocated to a future Arab State, on the eve of war Tawfik Abu al-Huda told the British that were other Arab armies to advance against Israel, Jordan would follow suit.